Rational choice as a toolbox for the economist: an interview with Itzhak Gilboa by Herfeld, Catherine
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Rational choice as a toolbox for the economist: an interview with Itzhak
Gilboa
Herfeld, Catherine
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.176
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-142144
Published Version
Originally published at:
Herfeld, Catherine (2014). Rational choice as a toolbox for the economist: an interview with Itzhak
Gilboa. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 7(2):116-141.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.176
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 
Volume 7, Issue 2, 
Autumn 2014, pp. 116-141. 
http://ejpe.org/pdf/7-2-int.pdf 
 
NOTE: Catherine Herfeld is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Munich Center for 
Mathematical Philosophy, Germany. Before coming to Munich, she was a research 
fellow at the Center for the History of Political Economy (Duke University), while 
finishing her PhD at Witten/Herdecke University in the history and philosophy of 
economics. This interview is part of a larger project entitled ‘Conversations on rational 
choice theory’, which aims at critically discussing the different manifestations            
of rational choice theory and the ways in which they have been used in philosophy  
and economics. Contact email: <Catherine.Herfeld@lrz.uni-muenchen.de> 
 
Rational choice as a toolbox for the economist: 
an interview with Itzhak Gilboa 
CATHERINE HERFELD 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Itzhak Gilboa (Tel Aviv, 1963) is currently professor of economics at the 
Eitan Berglas School of Economics at Tel-Aviv University and professor 
of economics and decision sciences at the Hautes Études Commerciales 
(HEC) in Paris. He earned undergraduate degrees in mathematics and in 
economics at Tel Aviv University, where he also obtained his MA and 
PhD in economics under the supervision of David Schmeidler. Before 
joining Tel Aviv University in 2004 and the HEC in 2008, Gilboa taught 
at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern 
University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Boston University. 
Gilboa’s main area of interest is decision-making under uncertainty, 
focusing on the definition of probability, notions of rationality, non-
Bayesian decision models, and related issues. He has published broadly 
in areas such as decision and game theory, microeconomics, philosophy, 
social choice theory, and applied mathematics. He has written over      
90 articles in these fields. Gilboa has furthermore written a textbook 
entitled Rational choice (Gilboa 2010a), in which he lays out what he 
takes to be the main toolbox for studying and improving human 
decision-making. Additional books include A theory of case-based 
decisions (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001), Theory of decision under 
uncertainty (Gilboa 2009), Making better decisions (Gilboa 2010b), and 
Case-based predictions (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2012). 
Professor Gilboa was interviewed by Catherine Herfeld at the 
department of economics of the University of Mainz (Germany) on July 
13, 2013. In this interview, Gilboa lays out his perspective on the nature 
and purpose of the rational choice paradigm, discussing it in the  
context of recent philosophical questions about the advantages of 
axiomatization and its relation to empirical research, the usefulness     
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of unrealistic assumptions, the future of neuroeconomics, the status of 
economics as a science, and his view of truth. 
CATHERINE HERFELD: Professor Gilboa, you are currently professor  
of economics and decision sciences at Hautes Études Commerciales de 
Paris. What, broadly speaking, are the decision sciences? 
ITZHAK GILBOA: ‘Decision sciences’ is a general term. As I understand 
it, ‘decision sciences’ refers to the field of decision in general. ‘Decision 
sciences’ encompasses decision theory, applied work, and experimental 
work. But the field of decision theory today is starting to undergo          
a process of ‘disintegration’. I do not want this to sound bad. This 
happened to game theory about 15 years ago. Both in game theory     
and in decision theory there is a general paradigm that is extremely 
beautiful and extremely insightful, and which has a lot to say about 
almost everything. But this general paradigm is at some point 
exhausted, and you start having to commit yourself to a specific type   
of theory you work with. And then you might find out that the theory 
you work with is not as general as the paradigm. 
Could you illustrate this view with an example? 
For instance, consider game theory, which is not too far away from the 
field of decision sciences, where you have a general approach to human 
interaction. You can model a wide variety of situations: you identify 
players and strategies to begin with, and then you have some things to 
say about the interaction. For example, the concept of Nash equilibrium, 
or maybe even that of a perfect equilibrium, allows you to say 
something insightful about everything that can be modelled as 
interaction among decision makers. It could be the interaction between 
couples, like battle of the sexes; it could be the interaction between two 
countries; it could be the interaction between buyers and sellers           
in a market; or it could be the interaction between species, such as in 
hawk-dove games. Surprisingly, game theory can capture those different 
situations and can say something meaningful about each of them, which 
is fantastic. But at some point, when you start looking at refinements of, 
for example, Nash equilibrium, or dynamics that would or would not 
lead to Nash equilibrium, you would say: ‘Wait a minute. The dynamics 
that would capture evolution are not the same sort of dynamics that   
are applicable to the market’. 
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So game theory constitutes a general paradigm, offering a set           
of theories and concepts that become modified for particular 
applications within this paradigm. In what way does this happen   
with decision theory? 
I think that in decision theory we see something similar. The general 
approach, taking Leonard Savage’s work as being the main achievement 
along those lines, could be used to think about any kind of problem 
under uncertainty (see Savage 1972 [1954]). We should identify states of 
the world, acts, and outcomes, and can use concepts such as probability 
and utility. As such, this general approach always has something 
meaningful to say about decision-making. But sometimes what it says   
is not enough. And when you start going beyond that, you might have to 
decide what exactly you want to apply this paradigm to, that is, whether 
what you understand as an ‘application’ is, for example, the situation   
of sitting down with a patient who has to decide whether to undergo 
surgery; or whether an ‘application’ is a purely theoretical model in 
applied theory. When you are sitting there with a patient who has to 
decide whether to undergo surgery or not, you have to estimate actual 
parameters; you have to take this general approach seriously. You also 
have to take it seriously when an application for you is pointing out to  
a colleague who is doing a search model in labour economics: ‘Wait a 
minute. Maybe you do not get this sigma, let us think about uncertainty 
instead of risk’. Both are called applications, but they are both very 
different things. And it is not at all obvious that the same paradigm,    
or conceptual framework, provided by decision theory is going to be 
relevant for both kinds of application to the same degree. In short, there 
is something common about the paradigm that is relevant to everything, 
but if you actually want to do something concrete with it, then you 
might have to commit to the kind of application you have in mind in 
order to capture the specifics of this particular application. This is what 
decision sciences and game theory have in common.  
As such, ‘decision sciences’ encompass many things. They include 
theoretical work and experimental work. Even within theory, one 
probably has to decide whether one is developing a theory to be used  
by theoretical economists, by empirical economists, or to actually make 
decisions about whether we should build nuclear plants, take a specific 
drug, or whatever. 
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Can we say that you understand the relation between the general 
paradigm of decision sciences and the theories formulated and 
applied within this paradigm along Lakatosian lines: we have a 
research program consisting of a hardcore (what you call the 
paradigm) that remains untouched, but allows for formulating 
specific, falsifiable theories to address a variety of concrete problems? 
Yes, that is right. To a large extent I see such a process along Lakatosian 
lines. Yet this process is not always accompanied by sufficient self-
reflection in the field. I think that decision theorists tend to think         
of decision sciences as providing a particular theory, not a general 
paradigm. As such, the distinction between the general paradigm and 
the theory is not always sufficiently clear. 
This sounds similar to the warning you voiced in your article entitled 
“Questions in decision theory” (Gilboa 2010c), where you also talk 
about the recent “soul searching” occurring in the decision sciences. 
Could you say a bit more about how the paradigm and the theories 
exactly relate to each other and why you think the distinction between 
a paradigm and an application is crucial? 
The theories are obtained from the paradigm by two main processes. 
First, there is a specification of terms. For example, when I think of a 
‘player’ in a game, it can correspond to a person or to a nation in a given 
reality. I can, for instance, decide to model an interaction in which      
the U.S.A. is a player, or to take the same interaction and think of the 
President of the U.S.A. as one player, Congress as another, and so on.  
We are confronted by similar modelling choices when we think of terms 
such as ‘state of the world’, ‘time period’, ‘strategy’, ‘outcome’. Hence, 
the same paradigm allows for a host of different theories, all compatible 
with it, for the very same real-life application. Second, there is a   
process of tweaking and generalizing a theory within the same general 
paradigm. For example, expected utility theory suggests that payoffs are 
aggregated by mathematical expectation, and someone, say Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), may propose that probabilities that are close to 
either 0 or 1 are ‘distorted’. In and of itself, this generalization can be 
viewed as a newer theory within the very same paradigm. Note, however, 
that other ideas of these two scholars broke from the standard theory  
in more dramatic ways. 
Keeping the difference between the paradigm and the theory is then 
crucial in appraisal for example when we discuss ‘theories’, whether 
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they ‘work’ or ‘fail’, and so forth. We should be careful to distinguish 
between different interpretations of the same mathematical models. 
Often the models of rational choice can be interpreted both as theories 
(coupled with auxiliary assumptions) and as paradigms, and often the 
empirical failure of the former does not imply that of the latter. This is 
why we should keep them strictly separate from each other.  
Your own work in decision theory mainly focuses on applications      
of the paradigm in epistemology—questions about belief revision, 
statistical decision-making, etc.—and in philosophy of science—taking 
the main goal-directed activity to be scientific inquiry. What are the 
potential uses of decision theory for the social sciences?  
I think that decision and game theorists are often interested in one of 
the most fundamental problems in the social sciences: How do people 
think, and how should they be thinking? As this is also a major concern 
for philosophers, it is why I also feel that parts of philosophy are           
a social science, especially if we focus on the normative question of  
how people should be thinking. When we take a more descriptive 
interpretation, we are closer to psychology and to its applications in 
behavioural economics. In these applications, there is a focus on ways of 
thinking that might be simply erroneous and that are not very useful  
for philosophy of science or statistics. But when we take a normative 
approach, asking ourselves how rational agents should be thinking in 
social set-ups, we are basically asking the question that a statistician 
asks when she wonders what can be inferred from the data, or that        
a philosopher of science asks if he takes a normative approach.          
For example, the preference for simple theories is considered to be an 
important criterion for the selection of theories (ever since Ockham), 
and it is correspondingly an important criterion for ‘model selection’    
in statistics. The two strands of the literature differ in many ways, but 
they are asking the same fundamental question. Therefore, it is not too 
surprising that similar ideas have been developed in these fields. 
Decision sciences have experienced an enormous expansion in the last 
decades, especially in the social sciences. Why do you think the 
representation of individual decision-making became so important, 
and how much does a mathematical theory of decision-making really 
matter in the social sciences? Economics, for example, seems to be at 
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least equally concerned with understanding macro-phenomena as 
with explaining individual behaviour. 
First, I am not sure what economics is concerned with, nor what            
it should be concerned with. For instance, if you are interested in 
predicting how many kids seek college education, or what it might    
take to change that number, you need decision theory more than 
macroeconomic theories. Second, if you are dealing with questions      
on the macro-level such as central bank policy or bank runs, you         
are interested in game theory and its decision theoretic foundations. 
This would certainly be the case if you are interested in, for example, 
the possibility of a war because of its effect on macro variables and on 
financial markets: whether a certain country will wage war on another is 
not a classical economic question, and it is one that decision sciences 
can help to analyze. In fact, it is quite difficult to talk about economics 
(or political science, for that matter), without the shadow of decision 
sciences hovering above your head. Consumers and firms, governments 
and politicians, traders and bankers do just that: they make decisions. 
But let me draw the link between the issue of the importance of a 
decision theory and axiomatization in economics. I find that the choice 
of the word ‘representation’ in your question is quite revealing, and this 
is where decision theory might be more important than one would 
expect: when one writes a model in macroeconomics, finance, or labour 
economics, whether the work is theoretical or empirical, there is often   
a need to model decision makers. Actual parameters may be assumed or 
estimated, but one needs a general framework into which parameters 
can be plugged. And this is why representation becomes important.       
It is a bit of a paradigm, as the specific parameters, defining a theory, 
are not yet specified. For that reason, one cannot yet test the 
representation, at least not in its intended use. One can test something 
similar to it in an experiment, but this gives rise to external validity 
issues. As a result, axiomatic work becomes more important: it is a    
way to convince scientists, who have not yet developed their economic 
theories, that a particular paradigm may be more useful to adopt and 
plug into their models. 
Your view on separating paradigms from theories has several 
implications, not only for the question of how we appraise decision 
theory, but also for the assessment of new fields such as 
neuroeconomics and experimental economics. Those new fields 
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provide new ways of addressing decision theoretic questions. But you 
also observe that the question emerges: “what would be the right mix 
of axioms and theorems, questionnaires and experimental, electrodes 
and fMRIs?” (Gilboa 2010c, 2). What do you think those new branches 
can contribute to the field of decision sciences? 
We can observe that many more people are now interested in 
neurological research, which is a good thing. At least if we ignore the 
moral dilemmas posed by neuroeconomics (both in terms of animal 
studies and in terms of alternative medical uses of equipment), it is a 
wonderful thing that we can know more about the human brain while 
making decisions. There is much more opportunity to connect between 
psychologists, neuroscientists, economists, decision theorists, game 
theorists, etc. And so far, neuroeconomics has been very exciting and     
I think that some of the questions that neuroeconomists pose are 
worthwhile.  
However, I suppose that at some point the communities of 
economics and neuroeconomics will disintegrate, or separate. 
Neuroeconomics as a community is probably going to flourish, not 
necessarily within economics, but maybe in psychology. It is just        
not obvious that neuroeconomics is the best use of resources if we want 
to solve economic problems. And I do not think that neuroeconomics 
makes economics any more promising than it was before there was 
neuroeconomics. For the time being, there seems to be a very large    
gap between what we know, what we can possibly measure, and what we 
need to know about the brain in order to deal with economic questions. 
I also think that more and more people are very sceptical of the 
reductionist idea underlying neuroeconomics. In short, neuroeconomics 
may be a very respectable field within psychology or neuroscience, but it 
is not necessarily changing the way we do economics. And I thus, in all 
likelihood, I think that these two fields of research—economics and 
neuroeconomics—will remain separate for decades to come. 
But you also seem to think that new fields, such as neuroeconomics, 
provoke novel questions for theoretical decision theory and that      
we can try to use decision theory to formulate those problems in        
a better, more precise, way. How fruitful do you consider attempts    
of behavioural economists or neuroeconomists to axiomatize their 
findings to reach a higher level of precision in formulating those   
new problems? 
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I make a living out of axiomatization, so I should not say anything bad 
about it. But people in the field are often not sufficiently self-reflective. 
Let us take an extreme view against axiomatizing scientific theories: 
some people would ask why one would axiomatize a theory at all.          
A theory should primarily match the data and thus we should first see  
if it in fact does so. Proving a characterization theorem that shows the 
equivalence of one formulation of a theory to another formulation does 
not, by definition, prove anything about the data. The two formulations 
will be just as close to, or far away from, the data. So you have to ask 
yourself: ‘Why am I doing this and what purpose does it serve?’  
But from my point of view, it is more important to axiomatize 
paradigms than theories. With respect to the axiomatization of a 
paradigm, I can tell a coherent story of scientific development where 
axiomatization would play a major role: scientists are dealing with 
various problems and we could help them. For example, many 
economists are developing models. And the questions that we can 
address are: ‘What models and theories should they be using?’ and      
‘In which language should they be formulating their models, when    
they develop them?’ Here, an axiomatization can help. And in such a 
way it could also help in behavioural economics and neuroeconomics. 
But I do not think that these fields have yet developed such a paradigm. 
To the extent the behavioural economics has a paradigm, it seems to be 
the same rational-choice paradigm of economic theory. 
So, what exactly is the purpose of axiomatization in economics? And 
what is the role of the decision scientist in this context?  
Imagine that, within their own discourse, some economic theorists 
cannot answer the question of which language they should use to 
develop a theory, or which paradigm they should use. This problem 
arises because they cannot yet compare the theory or the paradigm in 
question to the data because they have not gathered them yet. Post    
hoc economists could say: ‘Ok, this paradigm was great; it has allowed 
us to develop all these theories and explained all those phenomena’.  
But before that, they cannot resort to the data to help them convince 
each other. What decision theorists can do is use an axiomatization 
basically as a rhetorical device that says: ‘If you find these axioms 
reasonable, you should find the implication derived from those    
axioms reasonable’. In other words, they can try to convince the 
economist to use the mathematical results, which are sometimes useful. 
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Here comes fancy math, or at least surprising math, which shows you 
things that are not obvious. If you can imagine a very convincing        
but complicated proof that takes you from this set of axioms to this 
theorem, as for example Savage (1972 [1954]) or John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern (1947) did, then axiomatization is more powerful 
because it is not saying something that is obvious to see, but that is 
mathematically correct. But as mentioned before, I think that sometimes 
people in the field are not sufficiently self-reflective. While we should 
develop axiomatic theories, we should be more sensitive to the question, 
why we are doing that; why we play the game; whether we are really 
trying to be logical positivists; whether what we are trying to do is 
descriptive or normative; and what the role of axiomatic work is for 
realizing what we are trying to do. 
What you seem to say is that axiomatization might be useful in 
economics when we do not yet have a theory, when we want to derive 
specific, maybe surprising, conclusions from a set of axioms, because 
these conclusions might be hard to reach without axiomatization.   
But we can then subject the conclusions to empirical testing. You also 
seem to suggest that once we have a theory, we should take seriously 
the idea that it should explain the data. In order to fulfil those two 
roles, to what extent should axioms be inspired by reality? 
Yes, that is right! And I think that the important thing here is what we 
call ‘intuitive’ or ‘natural’, something that informs our axioms but is not 
necessarily related to a particular example or to a concrete empirical 
observation about how human beings in fact behave.  
So, is it sufficient for a good theory of decision-making that the 
axioms appear intuitively or naturally plausible?  
When you think about axiomatizing a paradigm and not a specific 
theory, a good decision ‘model’—let us avoid here the word ‘theory’—is 
one that will be relatively abstract and sufficiently general, so that I can 
use it to think about many specific theories. For instance, we can think 
in a rather general way that there is an outcome. I can specify what that 
means by thinking in terms of a particular example: you give me 100 
Euros. That is an outcome. But I can think of other definitions of 
‘outcomes’ that would include psychological and social payoffs as well, 
such as ‘getting 100 Euros when my friend got 1000’ or ‘accepting 100 
Euros when my friend was exploited by strategic weakness’, and so on. 
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Clearly, this re-definition of an outcome can result in theories that 
belong to the same paradigm, but have different predictions. The same 
would be true of other conceptual aspects of a general paradigm,     
such as ‘player’ and ‘strategy’, ‘state of the world’ or ‘time horizon’. 
Good models will typically need to be both abstract and convincing, 
where they can be convincing either because they are intuitive, or 
because they are mathematically derived from intuitive conditions 
(axioms). A model needs to be abstract to allow for a range of 
applications, for many specific theories, for us to feel that we have a 
general tool that can address many issues. It has to be intuitive for us to 
believe that these applications, often not yet developed, have a chance 
of making sense, explaining data well, and generating good predictions. 
But maybe some sort of abstraction is sometimes to be trusted  
more than focusing on a particular experiment that I just observed. 
Sometimes the examples that a group of scientists starts off with, 
especially if they have a particular experiment in mind, may be a 
somewhat biased basis for generalization. There are situations in which, 
when we think about them in the abstract, we might get a better global 
view of what is going on in such situations rather than if we get into   
the details. If you focus on one particular example in greater detail to 
subsequently generalize, that might affect your generalization; things 
present in the example might look bigger and more important to you 
than they really are, and sometimes you might get a better idea if       
you zoom out. The standard examples are availability heuristics: you 
estimate the probability of an event and you split it down to a couple of 
events and get a bigger estimate. That is a case where thinking more     
is not necessarily thinking better, because you end up with something 
that might be a worse example. For instance, we can talk about the 
probability of your car being stolen and elaborating on various 
scenarios. And, when you give me an estimate at the end, this estimate 
might be worse than what you would have given me based upon your 
overall intuition. I think something similar can happen when we think 
about an abstract problem. Of course this has to do with the external 
validity of the experiment, and if I am interested in something that is 
extremely close to that experiment, then it might be fine. But if I start by 
looking at an experiment and then I switch over to talk about how 
people behave in markets, even when this experiment was conducted in 
social psychology, I might get this problem.  
ITZHAK GILBOA / INTERVIEW 
VOLUME 7, ISSUE 2, AUTUMN 2014 126 
To make a long story short, sometimes we can overly generalize. So  
I would not insist so much on the idea that axiomatizations should be 
inspired by actual experiments, and on a very close relationship between 
empirical observation and axiomatization. Rather, as I said, I think 
axioms should be mostly generalizable and acceptable to us in an 
intuitive way.  
So what role should examples play then and which examples do you 
consider useful? 
We should not ignore examples, as it is fine to be motivated by an 
example. But I think that one must be able to understand the example  
as a sort of paradigmatic example, something that can be easily 
generalized so that one sees exactly what general point it makes.  
Could you give a particular instance of such a paradigmatic example? 
Sure! When David Schmeidler (1989) began with his research on 
probability and expected utility, he was not motivated by Daniel 
Ellsberg’s (1961) experiments. He looked at the Bayesian theory and 
found that it is too limited to capture uncertainty, especially when one 
is in a condition of ignorance. Schmeidler gives the example of the coin 
that comes out of his pocket that he has tested many times and the  
coin that comes from someone else’s pocket that he knows nothing 
about. I think the example is sort of paradigmatic. It is intuitively also 
quite convincing. It turned out to be very similar to Ellsberg’s two-urn 
experiment, but it was a mere example of a very general difficulty.       
By contrast, when people looked at Ellsberg’s experiment itself, I think 
that they had a tendency to develop theories that were much less 
generalizable. 
In your own work, empirical observation and axiomatization are 
closely related. Even when using a theory for prescriptive purposes, 
you consider the descriptive dimension relevant. For example, in your 
article “Rationality of belief or: why Savage’s axioms are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for rationality” (Gilboa, et al. 2012), you 
praise the flexibility of the rational choice paradigm compared to 
previous attempts in economics to conceptualize human behaviour. 
The notion of rationality that you refer to is basically defined as 
consistent choice. And obviously you use the axiomatic method to 
formulate this concept. But your definition of rationality is also 
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inspired by observed deviations from the rationality axioms. You 
stress that we should not think about rationality as detached from 
reality. Even when used as a normative concept, observing actual 
decision-making matters. Can you expand on your view about the 
usefulness of empirically inadequate axioms in both cases, i.e., for 
empirical and normative purposes? 
I stress the practicality of a decision theory in my work. Axioms or 
axiomatic theories in the social sciences have double lives. You try to 
use the theories that rest upon a set of axioms as positive theories and 
if they do not work, you try to sell those theories as normative theories. 
But even for their normative use, theories should be practical. As 
Reinhart Selten once informally said, a normative theory that says      
you should run 100 meter in 4 seconds is not very useful, because you 
simply cannot do it. As such, the theory does not allow for a practical 
prescription. When you think about a normative decision theory, it is 
important to think about the practical behaviours that could be selected 
by decision makers. That is what I wanted to capture by the notion of 
rationality that I have articulated.  
Could you give an example to introduce the idea of regret that 
characterizes your definition of rationality? 
For example, is it rational to make calculation mistakes? To answer    
this question, I ask: ‘Would you be embarrassed if I were to show you 
that you do not calculate correctly?’ Well, if it were the case that the 
calculation was too complicated to be performed correctly, you would 
probably not be embarrassed. If it is impossible for any human being   
to calculate correctly, you could respond: ‘How could anybody have 
known?’ In that case, your behaviour is rational according to my 
definition. It is consistent, or robust to our analysis, in the sense that 
preaching to you to behave differently would be useless. For the sake of 
usefulness, we need to somehow place practicality into the picture when 
endorsing normative theories.  
In your article entitled “Is it always rational to satisfy Savage’s 
axioms?” (Gilboa, et al. 2009, 289) you write: “The question we should 
ask is not whether a particular decision is rational or not, but rather, 
whether a particular decision is more rational than another. And we 
should be prepared to have conflicts between the different demands 
of rationality. When such conflicts arise, compromises are called for. 
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Sometimes we may relax our demands of internal consistency;           
at other times we may lower our standards of justifications for 
choices. But the quest for a single set of rules that will universally 
define the rational choice is misguided”. So you formulated a 
definition of rational choice that weakens the idea of a unique 
standard of rationality... 
My definition of rationality started with this: asking what do people 
have in mind when they refer to something as ‘rational’. But the best 
definition I came up with is in terms of what most people would be 
willing to accept as their decision making modes, as opposed to what 
they would like and could change. 
Is this definition of a rational choice pragmatically useful for 
improving one’s decision-making? 
Yes. I think that we can play around with definitions to our heart’s 
content, and judge them for elegance and beauty of results as we do     
in mathematics. But to the extent that we care about a particular 
definition—say, what is and what is not called ‘rational’, or, for that 
matter, ‘scientific’, and the like—we should ask what it is exactly that we 
care about in specific definitions and then choose them accordingly. 
Why do we bother to dub some modes of behaviour as ‘rational’ or 
‘irrational’? If it is only a matter of name calling, then it is not so clear 
that it is worth the effort. Rather, we need to think about what kind      
of discourse we have in mind that might be facilitated by a specific 
definition. Indeed, this boils down to a pragmatic position. 
How does the mathematics enter this picture? 
Part of what happens is that the way people choose is an issue of 
‘either-or’. Either a person makes decisions in a completely intuitive 
way, or she makes decisions in a supposedly rational, but at the same 
time highly mathematical way. People tend to view these two things, 
mathematics and rational choice, often as going hand in hand. People 
who are scared of mathematics often tend to not even listen to what 
insights there are behind the mathematical apparatus. Rather, they tend 
towards the other extreme, that is, they fully reject mathematical 
theories of decision-making. But one does not have to be scared of the 
mathematics. Good decisions, be that for individuals or for society as a 
whole, should involve some kind of dialogue between the theory and the 
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subjective input, be this an input that originates in emotions, intuitions, 
or something else. 
And what do you take ‘rational choice theory’ to be in this context? 
Well, it is a bit of everything. It is a toolbox and not everything in it       
is tightly related. It consists of a couple of useful things we find in 
decision and game theory, microeconomics, and so forth. Yet, they come 
from the same way of thinking, and they describe the state of the art    
in a way that is not too biased. I do think that these are very beautiful 
ideas that should be more publicly available. 
You mention at some point in your textbook Rational choice (Gilboa 
2010a) that you would like to live in a society where everybody knows 
about the tools in this book contains. Why? 
Yes, I do indeed think that. People vote. People make decisions for 
themselves and for us, and they do it based on various pieces of 
information that they get. This information can be highly manipulable. 
For example, you hear that a certain percentage of inmates belong to     
a certain ethnic group and people in their minds begin to think that 
people belonging to this ethnic group must be criminals. In this 
example, people confuse the probability of A given B with the 
probability of B given A, a psychological phenomenon we understand 
very well. But we could teach people to become aware of this confusion 
and learn to avoid it. 
Is improving decision-making your pedagogical aim when teaching 
with this textbook?  
Yes, I think it is valuable to teach the tools in this book to everyone, 
including people who have no background in mathematics and no 
willingness to get into that. Ultimately, mathematics itself is not 
important for the public debate. It is often rather a sort of barrier to 
entry to many people involved in practical decision-making. What is 
important is to convey the basic messages and to have people 
participate in such public debates in a more educated way and 
especially to address the basic questions about what is feasible in 
achieving the desirable. 
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So, we should use the toolbox of rational choice as a normative 
instrument to make people behave rationally... 
Yes, that is right. I think it could teach us to improve our reasoning   
and judgment, to think more critically about so-called experts, be it in 
politics, medicine, or whatever. Judging whether politicians are more    
or less successful could be done in a more rational way. I think I could 
even convince some of them that their way of making decisions can be 
improved (in their own eyes). I think it is essential to understand how  
to be rational in the context of economic and political questions, and to 
understand the nature of democracy in the context of the limitations   
of preference aggregation. 
Another thing that often bothers me in the political domain is that 
people tend not to think in terms of what is feasible when they think 
about what is desirable. For example, in political debates, people 
sometimes reason by assuming that what they want is also possible. 
This would be considered flawed reasoning according to many rational 
choice models. Indeed, most people would not make this type of 
mistake in the context of, say, a financial investment. But when it comes 
to ideological questions, it is often a big no-no even to pose the question 
of feasibility. 
In your account of rationality, you fuse several different dimensions 
of a theory of rational choice. You repeatedly talk about the trade-off 
between having a mathematically beautiful theory—one that people 
might not conform to—and a more descriptively accurate account    
of human behaviour. And, you use your toolbox of rational choice for 
prescribing the rational course of action. To make the mathematical 
theory more descriptively accurate, you can either change the 
theory—like behavioural economists do—or you can make people 
conform to the theory. You define rational choice as a choice where a 
decision maker does not want to change anything when confronted 
with a mathematical analysis of his or her behaviour; the decision 
maker might regret the choice in light of new information, but not as 
a result of a theoretical argument. This account of rational choice 
allows the study of how people in fact deviate from the prescribed 
rational choice and assumes that they would regret it. How exactly   
do you bring those different dimensions under one roof? How does 
this definition relate to what rationality is usually considered to be, 
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i.e., independent from subjective elements, arrived at by reason and 
rational calculation and serving as an ideal standard?  
First of all, I do not have any bit of understanding of metaphysics, so     
I do not know whether anything exists, unless I know how to measure it. 
And that is partly why I appreciate axiomatic work, because it gives 
concrete meaning to things that can be very abstract. I can only 
understand metaphysical concepts when there are psychological 
manifestations thereof. For example, I can talk about free will, but          
I only refer to the psychological phenomenon that people seem to 
experience making choices and exercising free will. Whether they really 
make free choices, and what that would mean, are questions I do not 
fully understand. Taking this non-metaphysical stance, I do not know 
what exists out there that is ‘independent from subjective elements’, 
and I am not even trying to grasp it. 
Second, I think of myself as a generally democratic, liberal person, 
and I do not think that I have the right to decide for people what to do 
with their lives, their children, their money, etc. I am in this sense, 
somewhat anti-elitist. If you ask me what we should do with taxpayers’ 
money, what we should teach in schools, and so forth, I would give 
answers that I believe I can support based on these people’s future   
well-being as perceived by them. For example, should we expose kids to 
Mahler’s music at school? I would say ‘Yes’. But I would say that not 
because I think Mahler’s music is great, although it is, but because          
I think that, if you were to run experiments, many people would   
acquire the taste for it and think that it is the greatest music that exists. 
I am not sure if I can make the same case for Karlheinz Stockhausen.    
If we have a kind of music that remains something extraordinary only 
for a very small group of people, an elite, it is not clear why we should 
use taxpayers’ money because it is not the case that most people would 
benefit from it. 
My non-metaphysical stance and my democratic criterion form the 
background to how I address the question of rationality: I do not believe 
we have access to anything out there that determines ‘true’ rationality 
independently of human beings’ judgment. And I do not think that        
a bunch of smart people should define what rationality is for the rest of 
humanity, whether the latter does or does not agree with it. I believe 
that, eventually, judgments of rational choice should go back to the 
people about whom we are talking, for whom we are making decisions, 
whose money we are spending. This is why my notion of rationality      
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is about explaining and convincing, and will eventually depend on the 
majority’s view. 
Yet, does your definition of a rational choice not presuppose          
that reasoning according to logical rules is of greater value than 
reasoning ignoring logic and that people would therefore regret 
violating the basic rules of logic? 
Not necessarily: I am willing to subject logic to the same test. True,         
I think that most people would be convinced by logic, and, for example, 
be able to understand modus ponens, and feel bad about violating it. 
But this claim of mine is an empirical claim. If you show me ample 
evidence to the contrary, I will have to give up my faith in logic as          
a widely accepted form of reasoning. I will have to admit that the 
structures I like in reasoning are not necessarily shared by people in   
the society I live in. I hope I will not be caught saying that these 
structures have ‘greater value’ than other structures. Just as I hope not 
to be supercilious about the kind of music or literature I consume.       
At present, I do believe that many of the principles we preach will, given 
the exposure, be adopted by a large majority of people. But I should    
be ready to admit that I might be wrong about that. 
Why, do you think, would people feel bad about violating the 
principles of rational choice? 
I believe that we have immediate, affective responses to cognitive inputs 
such as logical reasoning. It is akin to, or maybe just a special case of, 
aesthetic judgments. Just as we can have positive or negative affective 
responses to a painting or a piece of music, we can have such responses 
to reasoning. I conjecture that, as an empirical claim, we are hardwired, 
by and large, to enjoy coherent reasoning and to be aversive to 
contradictions. I suppose that we will have to go to evolutionary 
psychology to answer this question. We can explain much of our 
aesthetic and even ethical judgments by evolutionary stories and I think 
the same applies to reasoning and even to decisions. One can argue,   
for example, that because cyclical preferences were dysfunctional, 
humans evolved to dislike them, or to feel uneasy about them. 
How then are psychology and decision sciences exactly related? 
As most social sciences, decision sciences have a descriptive and a 
normative side: they are about what reality is, but also about how we 
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can change it. Psychology feeds decision sciences with facts about how 
people actually behave, which is the reality that has to be taken into 
account. At times one has the chance to try to change this reality (say,   
if someone asks you for advice). But then again you need to know 
something about reality—that is, what can possibly be done, what we 
can expect humans to do.  
And what are the implications of such a view for the potentials and 
limitations of rational choice theory? 
I indeed do not think it is a theory. In most real life situations, it does 
not commit to any specific prediction. Rather it is a way of thinking that 
may, at least post hoc, explain a remarkable array of observations and 
phenomena. When viewing rational choice as a paradigm rather than a 
theory, it offers ways of thinking about decision problems, but it does 
not commit us to produce a single, well-defined answer in all cases.    
For descriptive and normative purposes alike, a paradigm may offer 
more than one prediction or recommendation, and one may need to   
use common sense or ad hoc considerations to choose among them. In 
short, while the rational choice approach is indeed limited as a theory,   
I think it is quite successful as a paradigm, as a way of organizing our 
thoughts, and as a way of testing and critiquing reasoning. 
This relates to another prominent debate in philosophy of economics 
about the empirical limitations of economics as a discipline. There 
was a time in which philosophers like Alex Rosenberg did even call 
into question its status as a science (e.g., Rosenberg 1992). Critics      
of economics often referred to the axiomatic theory of rational choice 
as the main weakness of economic theory and believed that 
behaviourally or psychologically more accurate theories of individual 
agents would rescue economics from all its troubles. Is this still          
a legitimate criticism of economics and rational choice theory 
specifically? 
Economics certainly has limitations as a science. However, we should 
not take this criticism too seriously for two reasons. First, one should 
not expect to be able to predict the behaviour of large, complex, and 
causally interrelated systems such as economies, polities, or societies. 
Even in the case of weather prediction, where the basic physical laws  
are well understood, prediction for more than ten days ahead is     
rather limited. In the social sciences we have two additional problems:  
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a) we do not have the basic laws, the counterpart of the flow equations; 
b) we are dealing with systems that respond to the predictions        
made about them. Thus, there are some fundamental limitations to the 
possibility of predicting the behaviour of economies and we should  
have realistic expectations about these limitations. Indeed, when we are 
dealing with smaller, isolated systems, that are causally independent    
of each other and can be experimented with, prediction is much easier. 
Second, the failures of basic choice theory in psychological 
experiments are often exaggerated. Surely every axiom and every 
principle has counter-examples. The question is not whether a theory is 
perfectly correct, but whether it is incorrect in an important way for 
economic applications. Psychological experiments are selected by their 
ability to shed new light on the working of the human mind. They need 
not be a representative sample of economic decisions. I do not think we 
should be entrenched in defending our classical theories (as economists 
were some 20 years ago), but we should not get carried away to the 
other side, decide that the theory is completely wrong, and make 
predictions only on the basis of vague similarities between experimental 
situations and real-life economic decisions. 
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the empirical shortcomings 
of economic models are always to be sought in the rational choice 
foundations. Even if we are unhappy with a model’s predictions, I would 
argue that the problem rests only sometimes in the foundations of 
rational choice theory and very seldom in the rational choice paradigm. 
Let us start with the rational choice paradigm: behavioural economics, 
by and large, retains the paradigm. In fact, it has been criticized 
precisely on these grounds, namely, that it does not do much beyond 
incorporating one more variable in the utility function. As for rational 
choice theory, there are many problems in the very assumption that we 
observe equilibria, that all agents share the same beliefs, or that beliefs 
can be represented by probabilities. All these assumptions are highly 
questionable and have little or nothing to do with rationality, as              
I understand it. But even if you think that the agents should be rational 
à la Savage, and care only about monetary payoffs, the assumptions  
that they all have the same prior probabilities, or that they play an 
equilibrium of the game cannot easily be derived from each agent’s 
rationality, even when the terms are very broadly understood. 
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So, do economic models based upon rational choice foundations have 
epistemic value? 
Yes! Let me stress two more points. First, the rational choice paradigm 
can also be used for making predictions by drawing analogies to models, 
and not only by applying general rules. This is a different view of 
scientific reasoning than the classical, Popperian one, and it is a way in 
which economic models can be useful without providing general rules 
that are empirically validated. 
Second, an important role of economics is to criticize reasoning. Just 
as logic is a basic tool for such criticism, so is equilibrium analysis. 
According to this view, economics is not about making predictions,    
but only about finding flaws in reasoning by others (say, politicians).      
I think that there is little doubt that the rational choice paradigm has 
been very useful as an aid to such criticism. 
But would economics not lose its empirical value if we took its role to 
be criticizing reasoning? 
It is not the only way to understand or do economics. But suppose      
we do follow this line—economics can be very useful without being an 
empirical science. History is an example of a discipline that is broadly 
considered to be very useful. Yet, very few historians would venture to 
make empirical predictions as if they were scientifically based. Similarly, 
the standard view of philosophy is that it is very far from being           
an empirical science, yet that it is a good idea to study philosophy,    
and that, in some ways, the world will become a better place with 
philosophers. I believe that economists could justify the existence of 
their discipline in a similar way: focusing on criticism and helping 
society avoid major mistakes would be enough to justify the field      
and its costs to society. 
Taking this issue one step further, the status of economics as a 
science has frequently been addressed in discussions about using 
rational choice theory in economic models, asking the question 
whether a model based on descriptively unrealistic assumptions can 
have any epistemic value and, if so, what kind of knowledge it 
generates. In your book review (Gilboa, forthcoming) of Mary 
Morgan’s The world in the model (Morgan 2013) you highlight      
that one frequent defence of abstract economic models is that what 
matters for them to have epistemic value is not the realisticness of 
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assumptions, but the consistency of assumptions with reality. How 
much ‘inaccuracy’ can economists accept without jeopardizing the 
little if any empirical value that is still granted to economics, 
especially after the recent economic crisis? 
First, I think that the economic crisis of 2008 is not a good example.    
As mentioned earlier, economists are no better equipped to predict 
financial crises than are physicists to predict tsunamis. This goes back 
to the issues of complexity of the system, the inability to test the system 
in isolation, and so on. There are problems that the last crisis 
highlighted—whether it is a matter of incentives or the belief in free 
markets (which might involve a major component of betting)—but it 
should be born in mind that unpredicted crises do not cast doubt on 
economics as such any more than unpredicted tsunamis cast doubt     
on physics. 
Second, the easiest way to defend the position that economics has 
some value is to emphasize models as tools for criticism: models, even 
if they make assumptions that are generally implausible, can be very 
useful in testing the logic of claims being made in the public domain. 
And such criticism can be very useful and save us a lot of unnecessary 
suffering. Relatedly, assumptions that are implausible as general rules 
may still be very useful in constructing models that may be, to some 
degree, similar to reality. 
However, I do believe that the lack of realisticness should be kept in 
mind. And when we see economists who truly believe the predictions of 
their models, we should be wary. It is wonderful to have models, as long 
as we acknowledge their limitations. Here starts one important task     
of the philosopher. Philosophers should not just endorse the use of 
unrealistic assumptions. They should ask: ‘When and how do and 
should scientists use such assumptions despite their unrealism?’,    
‘Why do scientists find unrealistic assumptions still useful?’, ‘When 
should we, philosophers, warn them that they have been going too      
far with the implications of these assumptions?’ 
So, when should philosophers warn economists? 
This question has a theoretical and an empirical side. On the theoretical 
side, I could say that the answer depends on the model of philosophy of 
science that you apply to economics: do you think of it as a Popperian 
science, as a practice of reasoning by analogies, as a field of criticism, 
and the like. On the empirical side, I fear that I do not have a good 
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answer. My approach to philosophy of science as a social science 
requires that I restrict myself to its theories and keep silent on empirical 
questions. Just as I would not make empirical comments in, say, labour 
economics, I should not make them in philosophy of science. Hopefully 
there are empirical researchers who can give much better founded 
answers to these questions than I possibly could. 
Philosophers and psychologists are often ignored by economists     
and decision theorists. Although behavioural economics has gained 
prominence in economics, psychologically informed decision theories, 
such as the research program defended by Gerd Gigerenzer 
(Gigerenzer, et al. 2011) have not had a considerable impact on 
economics. Why? 
There may be several, perhaps related reasons for that. First, economists 
and decision theorists tend to be people who like beauty and elegance. 
Given a wonderful construction such as the Bayesian paradigm, it is  
just not fun to use other methods, which are less elegant, and whose 
inclusion would make the entire theory even messier. That is, one has  
to have a meta-theory, describing when one should use a Bayesian 
approach and when one should use other approaches. The whole thing 
may look rather ad hoc. Second, for many questions that are interesting 
to economists, the origin of beliefs as requested by the Bayesian 
paradigm may not matter that much. Thus, some economists ask:    
‘Why should I care? If I can capture the relevant aspects of behaviour by 
a model using probabilities, why should I bother to specify the process 
of generation of such probabilities? If I need to know the probabilities 
for empirical work, I will anyway have to measure them directly’.       
This line of reasoning also conforms to the ‘black box’ interpretation    
of choice theory—the revealed preference paradigm, on which          
most economists have been educated. I should mention that, while         
I personally take issue with this line of reasoning, it is not easy to make 
the case for the importance of the process, and it is particularly difficult 
to make an argument to convince economists that these foundational 
choices might lead to different predictions; partly because we are 
comparing paradigms, or languages, rather than specific theories. 
Could you nevertheless try to sketch such an argument? 
With pleasure! Suppose that we wish to predict economic behaviour 
after a financial crisis such as that of 2007-2008. Past examples are very 
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few, and it is hard to argue that we have observed behaviour under 
many similar circumstances. Worse still, these are causally intertwined: 
just because governments did little in 1929, they were prodded to do 
more in 2008. That is, we cannot use available data to make predictions 
as in standard statistics; the very fact that certain things happened 
changes the likelihood that they will happen again. So we cannot rely on 
the behaviour of the black box in the past, and pretend that we know 
enough about behaviour so as not to worry about cognition. And we 
have to ask: How do people think? Will they make predictions here       
by analogies or by rules? Will they end up using a probability measure, 
and if so, how will they find one? And, if not, what will they use instead? 
In short, when we have sufficient data on past cases that are similar and 
causally independent, we can say that how people think is a problem  
for psychologists, and we only care about their (economic) behaviour. 
But when we do not have enough such data, we have to roll up our 
sleeves and delve deeper into the decision making process. 
A similar observation of ignoring new approaches can be made in  
the research on decision-making under uncertainty. There are several 
kinds of axiom systems and more generally rational choice theories 
that attempted to capture the idea of uncertainty. There is the 
Bayesian approach, J. M. Keynes’s approach (Keynes 1921), and Isaac 
Levi’s work. Together with David Schmeidler (Gilboa and Schmeidler 
1989), you suggested an axiomatic foundation of the maxmin 
expected utility decision rule to address the problem of a non-unique 
prior for example, and thereby made an important contribution to 
decision making under uncertainty that takes the Knightian concept 
of uncertainty seriously (and also opposed many accounts that reduce 
uncertainty to risk for operational purposes). While those approaches 
have profoundly influenced each other, why do you think some         
of them failed to be influential in economics while others, like the 
Bayesian approach, were widely taken up? 
Isaac Levi’s work is mostly unknown to economists, but it also does not 
provide the axiomatization that is needed to convince economists that  
a particular paradigm is the one to use. So we are mostly left with the 
Bayesian paradigm and the alternatives proposed by the uncertainty 
theories, starting with Schmeidler’s version of Choquet expected utility 
(Schmeidler 1989), the maxmin rule, and others. 
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Independently of whether we think of these new theories as part of  
a ‘protective belt’ of the same traditional research program or as a new 
research program, I think they do get sufficient attention in economics. 
When economists see phenomena that are difficult to reconcile with   
the Bayesian approach, at some point they are willing to look a bit 
beyond—and then it becomes advantageous to have a model that is       
a slight generalization, as opposed to a whole new approach, using a 
different language. 
Surely, ‘paradigms’ or ‘conceptual frameworks’ such as Savage’s are 
adhered to longer than are specific theories, precisely because these are 
paradigms within which new theories can be developed. But there comes 
a point where people are willing to look beyond the paradigm as well. 
This process differs from Thomas Kuhn’s in that no one expects a 
theory—or a paradigm—to be universal (see Kuhn 1962). So that the  
fact that we need to go beyond a certain paradigm to explain some 
phenomena does not mean that the paradigm should be discarded.       
If you will, you can also argue that this is the case in classical examples 
such as physics. Just as Newtonian physics is still the basic working  
tool for engineering, the Bayesian approach may well remain the basic 
workhorse of economic theory. 
What are the most important unresolved questions in decision 
sciences today? 
Maybe we should start with resolved ones. I fear I do not know of any. 
We still do not know how people make, and should make decisions, 
under risk as well as under uncertainty, in lab situations and in real   
life, in economic set-ups, or in others. We have some wonderful ideas 
constituting a fantastic paradigm, but we have very few concrete 
answers. 
Yet, I think we gained a much better understanding of the questions. 
We learned to distinguish between, say, risk and uncertainty, groups  
and individuals, and so forth. But, as mentioned, I think we also need to 
distinguish between types of applications—say, a theoretical application 
where an economist plugs a representation into a formal model, or a 
practical one, where a patient decides whether to undergo an operation. 
Also, it is not clear that the same model would apply to people’s 
decisions when they trade stocks as when they get married, purchase 
products or wage wars, when they consciously make decisions, or find 
out that a certain decision has simply occurred. 
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In a sense, I think that we have not quite resolved the question of 
what decision sciences are about, or what their questions are precisely. 
In my view, we need to realize that there are many different questions 
that need not share an answer. Once we realize that, we can start asking 
which of these questions have been resolved. 
Do you expect decision sciences to progress? 
It is possible that we suddenly see less axiomatic models, just like       
we saw tons of refinements of the Nash equilibrium in the 1980’s and 
then, at some point, people lost interest in them. The research moved 
forward, or backward, or sideward. It is hard to tell whether it moved 
forward in a progressive way. There are always fads in the different 
disciplines. And although we now see a lot of general decision-theoretic 
models, it is possible that after a while people would still keep asking: 
‘What has decision theory done for us lately?’ And if the answer is 
negative, then we might be seeing less of these models.  
Are you after truth? 
Not in a metaphysical sense of truth that exists outside—I do not 
understand what it means. So, I am willing to do only psychological 
metaphysics, which is along the lines of ‘let us take a metaphysical 
question and consider its psychological manifestations’. Let me then 
reread ‘truth’, or translate the term to mean, a warm feeling of 
understanding, or the warm feeling that comes from understanding, 
coupled with the belief that I am not going to change my mind so soon. 
If that is truth, then yes, I am after that. I like to understand things,   
and mathematics allows me to do that because, once you check the 
proof, you rarely change your mind about it. You might change your 
mind more about things that cannot be mathematically proven or have 
not been proven yet. So in short, if the meaning of truth is psychological 
subjective truth, then yes, I am after it. 
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